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ARTICLE
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ABSTRACT
21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) is of significant importance for 
world freight transport. The ports along the MSR present a key element of 
the involved shipping networks to support the connectivity of the MSR. 
Therefore, it is crucial to carry an effective safety assessment of the ports 
to ensure the robustness and sustainability of the growing MSR. However, 
traditional quantitative risk analysis approaches (QRA) used in ports face 
many challenges when being applied within the context of the MSR, such 
as risk data incompleteness and ambiguity, and operational and environ-
mental uncertainties. This paper proposes a novel safety evaluation 
approach to address these issues encountered during the risk analysis 
process in the MSR ports. The fuzzy set theory (FST), an evidential reason-
ing (ER) approach, and the expected utility theory are integrated in 
a holistic way in the proposed methodology. The proposed methodology 
is used to analyse five key ports along the MSR. The results provide 
decision-makers with useful insights on enhancing port safety, effective 
route planning as well as improving operational efficiency.
KEYWORDS 
Port safety; risk assessment; 
maritime silk road; fuzzy set 
theory; evidential reasoning; 
maritime transport
1. Introduction
The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), initiated by China in 2013, connects more than 65 
countries which jointly account for over 62% of the world’s population, about 30% of the world’s GDP 
and around 24% of the household consumption (CITI (China International Trade Institute) 2015). 
There are over 600 ports along the MSR, with the number of major ports from Africa, Asia, and Europe 
amounting to 228 (CGTN (China Global Television Network) 2019). The MSR emphasises on 
transportation connectivity and economic cooperation among the involved countries. It aims to 
enhance cooperation in the fields of economic interests, international trade, and shipping transporta-
tion. With the initiative of the 21st MSR, the demand for international shipping is increasing which 
leads to the growing throughput of ports along it in one hand and higher risk concern and safety stake 
in the other. Ports not only play an important role in economic activities but also possess a critical social 
function. The development of ports has stimulated trade activities and job opportunities, thus aids to 
boost the port states’ economy and social stability. The MSR provides an opportunity for the develop-
ment of international ports as well as a challenge for the industry to reform and meet the increasing 
demands. Being the critical key nodes along the MSR that connect sea and land, ports need a robust 
safety evaluation framework to guide rational risk-based decision. However, ports are highly vulnerable 
to potential threats and uncertainties due to their critical locations, complex service systems, and social- 
economic functions (Alyami et al. 2019). The ports along the MSR are characterised with different 
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features and backgrounds influenced by various cultures. A new safety evaluation framework that can 
provide a common standard for risk analysis along the MSR ports will facilitate the coordination and 
cooperation of safety resources at a global/macro level for safe ship network configuration.
Port safety is attracting increasing attention given the occurred accidents in recent decades. For 
example, the lock-out of the American West Coast Port in 2002 cost 20 USD billion in 10 days; the 
Typhoon Maemi caused significate loss of Port of Busan in 2003, and it toppled 8 giant cargo cranes 
and damaged other 3, which cost the government over 15 months for their recovery; the earthquake 
occurred off the coast of Japan in 2011 generated a tsunami which had resulted in 15,899 deaths and 
2,529 people missing; the Fukushima nuclear disaster had forced more than 100,000 people to 
evacuate because of radionuclides to the environment; and the explosion of Tianjin Port in 2015 
killed 173 people and injured hundreds. To ensure the stabilization and connectivity of the MSR, it 
is necessary and beneficial to develop a generic risk assessment model that is able to assess different 
types of risks in the port management and operation.
Many authorities and organizations have also proposed a number of maritime safety measures 
via regulations (port state control and formal safety assessment) for safe port operations (Yang et al. 
2018; Alyami et al. 2019). At large, the implementation of the measures, particularly those on 
a voluntary basis, requires appropriate risk assessment for its justification. It has been a challenge to 
assess the safety of ports using traditional risk assessment approaches when new operational 
environments (e.g. MSR) and emerging risk types (e.g. pirate attacks) are involved. Traditional 
risk assessment approaches such as Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) have been criticized with two major deficiencies, 1) 
relying too much on failure data and hence exposing the inability to process data with a high level of 
uncertainty; and 2) the insufficient ability to synthesis different types of data, qualitative and 
quantitative (Yang et al. 2009; Cao and Lam 2019). As a result, new uncertainty methods have 
been proposed to address the above deficiencies, such as fuzzy set theory (FST), Bayesian Network 
(BN), evidential reasoning (ER), and Markov models.
Selection of an appropriate risk analysis method depends on the feature of the system to model. 
Safety evaluation of the MSR ports is characterised by (1) the different data formations of safety 
indicators in different countries (Mokhtari et al. 2012), (2) the scarcity in historical statistical data in 
terms of port accidents (Yang et al. 2009). ER when combined with FST can accommodate both 
qualitative and quantitative indicators and synthesise port safety performance against different indi-
cators to a system level for an overall safety evaluation. The involvement of the indicators can be 
adjusted by their weights in the ER model to reflect the reality of the investigated ports in a particular 
region. This paper applies the FST and ER approach to assess the safety of a few selected ports along 
the MSR in which FST is used to cope with the uncertainty in data and ER for the synthesis of different 
types of information from multiple risk factors. The novelty of this work lies in the presentation of 
a generic framework that can aid the analysis of different types of risks in the same framework and 
create a standardised safety process for the ports from different geographies along the MSR corridor.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature focusing on 
port safety evaluation, followed by the detailed description of the proposed risk assessment frame-
work in Section 3. A case study regarding MSR port safety evaluation is applied to demonstrate the 
feasibility of the methodology in Section 4 and risk implications of the selected MSR ports in 
Section 5. Section 6 presents the conclusion and future work.
2. Literature review
2.1. Review of port safety assessment
Although port safety assessment is crucial to ensure the robustness and sustainability of the 
associated shipping routes (e.g. MSR), a careful literature review indicates a lack of robust safety 
analysis of ports compared to other port management research, such as port competition and 
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cooperation (e.g. Song, Tang, and Zhao 2018; Ishii et al. 2013), port efficiency (e.g. Serebrisky et al. 
2016; Suárez-Alemán et al. 2016; Yuen, Zhang, and Cheung 2013), port performance (Chen et al. 
2016), green port development (e.g. Aregall, Bergqvist, and Monios 2018; Wan et al. 2018), regional 
ports evaluation and economy development (e.g. Deng, Lu, and Xiao 2013; Svindland, Monios, and 
Hjelle 2019; Pallis, Vitsounis, and Langen 2010), and port governance (e.g. Zhang et al. 2019). The 
ones that are associated with port safety have been focusing on a particular type of risk, such as 
catastrophic events, (e.g. major explosions) (Cao and Lam 2019), facility security issues (Yang, Ng, 
and Wang 2014), security policy issues (Yeo, Pak, and Yang 2013), (security has been considered as 
a part of safety in Yang, Wang, and Li (2013)), and operation failures (Alyami et al. 2014). It is 
therefore needed to develop a generic risk assessment model that is able to assess different types of 
risks to fulfil the research gap.
In the past decade, studies have been conducted in the attempt to assess port safety from both 
qualitative and quantitative perspectives, among which FMEA is one of the most widely used 
methods. The traditional FMEA uses three indicators (namely occurrence likelihood, consequence 
severity, and probability being undetected) to assess safety (Braglia, Frosolini, and Montanari 2003). 
In order to facilitate the applications of FMEA, uncertainty modelling methods are incorporated. 
For Alyami et al. (2014), (2019)) presented new approaches based on a Fuzzy Rule-Based BN and 
ER respectively to facilitate the process of FMEA in container port safety evaluation. The proposed 
approaches had the capability of dealing with uncertainties thus allowing dynamic risk-based 
decisions in port safety. However, the approaches had only been applied in individual container 
terminals and its feasibility in other ports of different geographical, size and economic features is yet 
verified, required more empirical evidence to found. Cao and Lam (2019) developed a fast reaction- 
based port model that embedded a fuzzy ER approach and the fuzzy TOPSIS to assess seaport 
vulnerability. The proposed approach allowed the quantification of ex-post port vulnerability with 
a state of ‘black box’. However, it analysed the catastrophes that feature high negative impacts and 
low frequency and other types of hazards beyond the consideration of the analysis.
To undertake port risk analysis in a systematic manner, we collected and analysed the papers on 
risk analysis of ports from academic journals written in English. The keywords used to search the 
papers contained ‘seaports’ and ‘risk/safety analysis/assessment’. The data sources include web of 
science, science direct, Wiley InterScience, and engineering village. Seventy-nine papers were 
founded from the paper screening. By reading the titles and abstracts, 71 papers were selected, 
and then, 20 papers are found relevant after reading their full contents. Among the 20 papers, those 
of duplicated abstracts and methods, and review papers were excluded. Finally, 5 papers retain and 
are analysed as follows. Mokhtari et al. (2011) proposed a risk management framework incorporat-
ing FTA and ETA to evaluate the safety of seaports and offshore terminals. The FST and possibilistic 
approaches were applied to deal with incompleteness and vagueness of data. Although the key 
findings enabled port managers to design and implement their own safety management, it did not 
incorporate incompleteness in subjective evaluation and only focused on operational risk that was 
evaluated to complete the risk assessment. Similarly, Mokhtari et al. (2012) and John et al. (2014) 
also focused on the operational management of ports without considering the impact of other risk 
factors on ports. More specifically, Mokhtari et al. (2012) proposed a decision support framework 
based on the fuzzy set to manage port risk. The integrated methodology and model were tested by 
a case study that showed its applicability for the risk assessment of ports and terminals in various 
situations. John et al. (2014) introduced a fuzzy set theory-based risk assessment approach to 
facilitate the treatment of uncertainties and modelling of the safety systems in seaport operations. 
Yang, Ng, and Wang (2014) carried out a quantitative analysis of port security assessment by using 
a novel fuzzy ER method. This work yet focused on port facility security such as terrorist attacks and 
suicide hijackings, which could generate impacts on port facilities thus disrupt the normal opera-
tion of the investigated ports. Lee et al. (2018) had undertaken a review of the Silk Road Economic 
Belt and the 21st Century MSR. The study revealed that ports was one of the key structural elements 
of the MSR, and identified the expected impacts of port safety on global trade. However, none of the 
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above studies had investigated a generic framework that can standardise the safety assessment 
process of various ports of diversified features along the same freight corridor, which requires the 
cooperation among the investigated ports.
2.2. The fuzzy set with a belief structure
When objective failure data is absent, risk assessment mainly depends on the knowledge of domain 
experts and their subject judgements where a large number of uncertainties are often involved. 
Subjective risk analysis had been widely applied to cope with emerging risks and/or systems 
involving new features/environments. Nevertheless, with the development of complex networks 
(e.g. maritime transportation), the risk assessment process becomes more complex due to the 
increasing risk factors. It is difficult for analysts to apply simple subjective approaches such as 
Risk Priority Number (RPN) in FEMA to accurately judge the impact of risk factors, hence 
requiring the assistance of advanced modelling techniques.
As an extension of a classical set, a fuzzy set was introduced by Zadeh (1975) to deal with the 
fuzziness of subjective data. Fuzzy logic-based approaches are powerful to analyse complex or ill- 
defined systems when the available information is qualitative and imprecise (Liu et al. 2004). The 
fuzzy rule base with a belief structure has been demonstrated as a useful application in practice in 
terms of dealing with a non-linear dynamical system (Liu et al. 2005). FST with a belief structure can 
provide a better way to represent expert knowledge when experts are not 100% certain about their 
judgements (Yang et al. 2009). It has been used in engineering system reliability analysis but not yet 
in port safety evaluation. The application of a fuzzy set designed on the basis of a belief structure in 
engineering systems could capture uncertainty and non-linear relationships between risk factors 
with various types and safety levels (Liu et al. 2004, 2005; Yang and Wang 2015). In the maritime 
risk study areas, the fuzzy logic techniques have been used in waterway transportation systems 
(Zhang et al. 2016), seaports and terminals (Mokhtari et al. 2012; John et al. 2014), maritime supply 
chain (Wan et al. 2019a, 2019b) and port infrastructure (Yang, Ng, and Wang 2014). However, up 
to the authors’ best knowledge, the current relevant literature witnesses few studies on fuzzy rule 
based with a belief structure on port safety studies as well as on the analysis of the risks from 
different perspectives (e.g. technical and operational) relating to seaports in the same framework.
2.3. ER approach and applications in port risk analysis
ER was developed based on the Dempster Shafer theory. It has been interpreted and presented by 
different algorithms on the basis of decision theory and the D-S theory of evidence. The one widely 
used in dealing with uncertainty and incompleteness in risk assessment was introduced by Yang 
(2001). The major advantages of using Yang’s ER approach include (Liu et al. 2005):
(1) It can provide an alternative way of dealing with both quantitative and qualitative informa-
tion systematically.
(2) It has the ability to represent the incomplete, uncertain, and vague data as well as complete 
and precise data by using the belief structures.
(3) It is capable of synthesizing the information in a rational way.
(4) It can present the risk result against different criteria at the different levels of the hierarchy.
The applications of ER in risk analysis are mainly in general engineering areas (i.e. 147 results 
from WoS when using ‘evidential reasoning’ and ‘risk analysis’ as the keywords to search). Its use in 
the maritime industry becomes increasing as evidenced by 19 out of the 30 articles (when using 
‘evidential reasoning’, ‘risk analysis’ and ‘maritime’ as the keywords to search on WoS) are from the 
recent five years. Comparatively, the use of ER in port risk analysis is much less, only having 7 
papers since 1970 that dealt with different risks across different types of terminals, including the 
aforementioned Alyami et al. (2019), Cao and Lam (2019), John et al. (2014), Yang, Ng, and Wang 
(2014), Mokhtari et al. (2012) and Liu et al. (2004). Investigation of ER use in the analysis of 
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multiple risks across multiple ports from intercontinental countries along the same shipping route/ 
trade corridor is new, compared to the previous port safety studies most of which are from west 
European countries. It is also expected that the finding can generate more experimental evidence on 
the feasibility of ER in port risk analysis for its generalisation in theory and popularity in port safety 
management in practice. From the MSR research viewpoint, the case will investigate the ports along 
the MSR, the findings will be unique and implications will provide useful insights for the safety 
cooperation of the upper stream and downstream ports in a transport chain as they are expressed in 
the same universe.
3. Framework and methodology
The proposed risk assessment framework is shown in Figure 1. It consists of four main steps 
including, 1) Establish a risk assessment hierarchy structure for an MSR port, where the unique risk 
factors and their hierarchical structure characterising the MSR are identified; 2) Evaluate the 
identified risk factors by a new approach in which the probability of occurrence and severity of 
consequence of each risk factor are defined and measured using FST and a belief degree concept; 3) 
Synthesis the evaluation results of all the risk factors using an ER algorithm, and 4) Obtain crisp 
numbers for risk prioritization which can be used as a reference for rational safety resource 
allocation.
3.1. Step 1. identification of risk factors and the establishment of a port risk assessment 
hierarchy
In this step, all the relevant factors influencing port disruptions are carefully investigated and 
identified. This can be achieved through the consultancy from industrial and academic experts and 
literature review (Mokhtari et al. 2012; John et al. 2014; Pak et al. 2015; Zhang et al. 2016; John et al. 
2016; Alyami et al. 2019). Necessary changes have been made on the basis of the factors previously 
identified in port risk assessment in the literature by tracking into account the characteristics of 
MSR from the domain experts. Zhang et al. (2016) identified four sub-factors including human, 
vessel, environment, and management associated with port safety evaluations. Mokhtari et al. 
Contacting key representative ports

















Step 3Application of the ER 
algorithm
Acquisition of risk 
ranking
Step 4
Figure 1. The proposed generic framework for the risk assessment of the ports along the MSR.
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(2012) had added security risk factors into the risk management of seaports and terminals. Since 
some ports along the MSR have suffered severe threats from pirates and/or terrorist attacks, the 
security risk factors are also incorporated in this paper. With the development of the MSR, an 
increasing number of vessels will be involved in freight transport which could lead to more vessel 
accidents and congestion. In addition, the MSR project has contributed to the new investment of 
many ports to improve their infrastructure for improved efficiency. The factors associated with 
equipment failures have therefore been taken into account in the hierarchical structure. The 
detailed factors in the hierarchical structures are presented in Section 4. These factors can sever 
as the baseline for MSR ports to develop their specifically tailored risk factor hierarchies.
3.2. Step 2. application of FST with a belief structure
After the risk factor identification and hierarchical structure construction in Section 3.1, the second 
step is to conduct basic risk assessment (ABS (American Bureau of Shipping) 2003). Li and Liao 
(2007) and ABS (American Bureau of Shipping) (2003) suggested that the probability of occurrence 
(P) and severity of consequence (S) affect risk in a simple multiply way. The risk can be presented 
using the following equation: 
R ¼ P � S (1) 
where R represents the risk level of an identified factor, P is the probability of occurrence of the risk 
factor, S denotes the severity of consequence of the factor, � symbolizes fuzzy multiplication. The 
probability of occurrence of a risk is measured by the number of occurrences per unit time, and the 
severity of consequence defines the scale of the risk event that has a negative effect on ports. To be more 
specific, the consequence severity of a risk factor can be measured by the number of people affected, the 
amount of cargo damaged, the time of transportation delayed, the property of the system loosed, the 
area of operation affected, and other negative impacts (ABS (American Bureau of Shipping) 2003; Wan 
et al. 2019a). As the guidance of risk assessment, the definition has been widely used in many industries 
such as environmental system (Bereskie et al. 2017), metropolitan construction projects (Kuo and Lu 
2013), manufacturing sector (Djapan et al. 2019), oil and gas offshore (Lavasani et al. 2011; Baladeh, 
Cheraghi, and Khakzad 2019), municipal infrastructure (Shahata and Zayed 2016). Since the P and 
S will be defined by using fuzzy sets, R will also be presented by fuzzy numbers according to the Eq. (1). 
Therefore, the fuzzy risks can be calculated using the following formula: 
~R ¼ ~P � ~S (2) 
where ~R represents the risk level in a fuzzy set, ~P and ~S are the probability of occurrence and the 
severity of consequence in a fuzzy form, respectively. In the next sub-sections after introducing the 
fuzzy sets and numbers, it will be described how to use the fuzzy sets with belief structures.
3.2.1. Definition of the probability of occurrence and the severity of consequence
In risk assessment, it is hard for analysts to quantify the risk associated with high uncertainty. 
Analysts sometimes cannot give exact values for evaluating risks in many practical situations. 
Therefore, they usually prefer to assessing risks using linguistics terms/levels, such as high, low, 
rather than specific numerical values. Therefore, the linguistic terms, rather than specific values, are 
adopted to describe the uncertainties by incorporating an extension of crisp sets.
Miller (1956) indicated that the number of linguistic terms should be between 4 and 7. Usually, 
too few terms will limit the expression of analysts, while too many terms will impose significant 
costs on the assessment process. After review the previous studies on maritime risk assessment 
(Lavasani et al. 2011; Mokhtari et al. 2012; John et al. 2014), five levels are selected for experts to 
represent the probability of occurrence and the severity of consequence. Regarding their fuzzy 
membership, the straight-line membership functions, such as triangular membership functions are 
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used due to its simplicity and wide applications in the field of risk assessment (Yang et al. 2009; 
Mokhtari et al. 2012; John et al. 2014; Cao and Lam 2019). The FST with subjective linguistic terms 
is applied to define risk and its parameters. The linguistic definitions and fuzzy membership 
functions for P and S are carefully examined and verified by domain experts to fit with MSR context 
based on previous studies in subjective risk modelling (Mokhtari et al. 2012; John et al. 2014). The 
overlapping triangular membership functions are verified by experts as shown in Table 1, 2 and 
Figure 2.Table 2
The definition of P is presented in Table 1. As for S, it can be divided into three aspects including 
‘Damage to economic (SEC)’, ‘Loss of life (SLI)’, and ‘Damage to environment (SEN)’ with the 
guidance of previous works about the development of the MSR and risk assessment (ABS 
(American Bureau of Shipping) 2003; CGTN (China Global Television Network) 2019; Lee et al. 
2018). SEC is measured by the percentage of the value of goods affected by various risks; SLI 
expresses the loss of lives or injures after a disruption; SEN represents the degree of damage to the 
environment caused by a disruption, which is expressed by the percentage. The overall consequence 
for S is then calculated by synthesizing the three consequences through fuzzy averaging.
3.2.2. Application of a belief structure in FST
The risk level of port disruption is the multiplication of the probability of occurrence and the 
severity of consequence as it was presented in Eq. (2). At the same time, the fuzzy risk level of port 
disruption can be calculated by ~P ¼ lp;mp; up
  �
and ~S ¼ ls;ms; usð Þ as follows: 
H ¼ TFNPS ¼ TFNP � TFNS ¼ lp � ls;mp �ms; up � us
  �
(3) 
where H can be expressed by five grades in this paper (e.g. H1; H2;H3;H4;H5½ � ¼ {Very low, Low, 
Medium, High, Very high}). For example, if a risk based on experts’ judgement has a probability of 
occurrence (P) of high (0.50, 0.75, 1.00) and severity of consequence (S) of medium (0.25, 0.50, 
0.75), the corresponding risk will be TFNPS (0.125, 0.375, 0.75). Then, the TFNPS will be trans-
formed into a fuzzy risk to conduct the following steps of risk assessment. The process of 
transformation contains 5 steps according to Sadiq, Saint-Martin, and Kleiner (2008). The detailed 
of these steps are illustrated in Figure 2 and Table 3 and explained as follows within the context of 
this study:
1. Map TFNPS over TFNR (five grades defined i.e. VL, L, M, H, VH triangles shown in Figure 2). 
The TFNPS is drawn in dotted lines, and the TFNR is drawn in solid lines.
2. Determine the points where TFNPS intersects with the membership of each linguistic term of 
TFNR in Figure 2. The points are described by solid black circles.
Table 1. The linguistic terms and fuzzy membership function for P.
Granular Linguistic terms Probability description Triangular fuzzy number
1 Very low (VL) <10% (0.00, 0.00, 0.25)
2 Low (L) 10%-35% (0.00, 0.25, 0.50)
3 Medium (M) 36%-64% (0.25, 0.50, 0.75)
4 High (H) 65%-90% (0.50, 0.75, 1.00)
5 Very high (VH) >90% (0.75, 1.00, 1.00)
Table 2. The linguistic terms and fuzzy membership function for S.
Granular Linguistic terms SEC SLI SEN Triangular fuzzy number
1 Very low (VL) < 20% No injuries < 5% (0.00, 0.00, 0.25)
2 Low (L) 20%-39% Minor injuries 5%-19% (0.00, 0.25, 0.50)
3 Medium (M) 40%-59% Injuries 20%-39% (0.25, 0.50, 0.75)
4 High (H) 60%-80% Major injuries 40%-65% (0.50, 0.75, 1.00)
5 Very high (VH) > 80% Loss of life >65% (0.75, 1.00, 1.00)
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3. Use a maximum figure if TFNPS and a linguistic term of TFNR intersect at more than one 
points. (e.g. There are two intersection points with medium if the lower boundary moves from 0.75 
to 0.8 in Figure 2, and the maximum value of the interacted figure points will be selected.)
4. Build a set of intersecting points to define a non-standardized five grades using a fuzzy set (i.e. 
five selected points in Figure 2, result in HR [0.25, 0.75, 0.80, 0.4, 0], shown in Table 3).
5. Standardize HR to obtain H that represents the belief structure (i.e. every value of membership 
μi of HR (i=1, 2, 3, 4, 5) is converted to μ
�
i by the cardinality C (the sum of all the value of μi) as Eq. 




μi ¼ μi=C (4) 
3.3. Step 3. application of an ER approach
Since each risk factor contributes differently to the port risk level, it is necessary to take their weights 
into account to show their relative significance in the risk assessment process. The relative weights 
of the risk factors are determined using an Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) method (Saaty 1998) 
through the discussion among domain experts. The detailed process of determination is illustrated 
in Section 4. Once the weights and belief structure of all risk factors are determined, the ER 
algorithm is applied to synthesize all the information and generated the overall risk results at the 
whole port system levels.
According to Section 3.2, the grades for risk factors are defined by Eq. (5). The generation of 
a risk factor Ri using a belief structure is expressed by S Rið Þ in Eq. (6). The conversion of the degree 
βni Rið Þ into basic probability is shown in Eqs. (7)—(12) 











Very low Low Medium High Very high
Figure 2. Example of transforming TFNPS (fuzzy rating) to HR (belief structure).
Table 3. Example of transforming TFNPS to fuzzy risk H
*.
TFNPS (0.125, 0.375, 0.75)
Grade Very low Low Medium High Very high
HR 0.25 0.75 0.80 0.4 0
[0.25, 0.75, 0.80, 0.4, 0] (C = 2.20)
H 0.11 0.34 0.37 0.18 0
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H ¼ H1;H2; � � �;HNf g¼ VL; L;M;H;VHf g (5) 
SðRiÞ ¼ ðβ1i ðRiÞ;H1Þ; ðβ
2




N ¼ 5 (6) 
mi;n ¼ ωiβni Rið Þ; "i 2 1; � � �; Lf g; "n 2 1; � � �;Nf g (7) 
mi;M ¼ 1  
XN
n¼1
mi;n ¼ 1   ωi
XN
n¼1
βni Rið Þ; "i 2 1; � � �; Lf g (8) 
�mi;M ¼ 1   ωi;"i 2 1; � � �; Lf g (9) 





;"i 2 1; � � �; Lf g (10) 
XL
i¼1
ωi ¼ 1 (11) 
mi;M ¼ �mi;M þ ~mi;M (12) 
βni Rið Þ—the degree to which the risk factor Ri belongs the assessment grade Hnwith β
n
i Rið Þ � 0 and 
PN
n¼1
βni Rið Þ � 1. If 
PN
n¼1
βni Rið Þ ¼ 1, the risk assessments from analysts stand for complete; otherwise, 
it exists ignorance.
mi;n—basic probability mass to which the ith risk factor Ri supports the conclusion,
ωi—the relevant importance of ith risk factor Ri,
mi;M—unassigned probability mass to any grades,
�mi;M—unassigned probability mass account for the relative importance of risk factors,
~mi;M—unassigned probability mass account for the incompleteness of the assessment.
Then, the sub-risk factors of Ri can be assessed by repeating the above steps (Yang 2001). For 
example, we define the AI ið Þ ¼ A1;A2; � � � ;Aif g as the subset of Ri, mI ið Þ;n is a basic probability mass 
to which the ith risk factor Ai supports the conclusion,mI ið Þ;M is the unassigned probability mass to 
any grades, �mI ið Þ;M is the unassigned probability mass account for the relative importance of sub-risk 
factors, ~mI ið Þ;M is the unassigned probability mass account for incompleteness of the assessment. Let 
mI 1ð Þ;n ¼ m1;n n ¼ 1; � � � ;Nð Þ and mI 1ð Þ;M ¼ m1;M with �mI 1ð Þ;M ¼ �m1;M and ~mI 1ð Þ;M ¼ ~m1;M . Next, 
the above basic probability masses are aggregated by using Eqs. (13)—(19) (Yang 2001). 
Hnf g : mI iþ1ð Þ;n ¼ KI iþ1ð Þ mI ið Þ;nm iþ1ð Þ;n þmI ið Þ;nm iþ1ð Þ;M þmI ið Þ;Mm iþ1ð Þ;n
� �
(13) 
"i 2 1; � � � ; Lf g;"n 2 1; � � � ;Nf g (14) 
mI ið Þ;M ¼ �mI ið Þ;M þ ~mI ið Þ;M"i 2 1; � � � ; Lf g (15) 
Mf g : ~mI iþ1ð Þ;M ¼ KI iþ1ð Þ I ið Þ;M iþ1ð Þ;MþI ið Þ;M iþ1ð Þ;MþI ið Þ;M iþ1ð Þ;M
h i
(16) 
Mf g : �mI iþ1ð Þ;M ¼ KI iþ1ð Þ (17) 
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"i 2 1; � � � ; Lf g (18) 
Hnf g : βn ¼
mI Lð Þ;n
1  I Lð Þ;M
"n 2 1; � � � ;Nf g (19) 
Mf g : βM ¼
I Lð Þ;M
1  I Lð Þ;M
(20) 
where, βn and βM mean the belief degrees to which the sub-risk factors support the grade Hn and M, 
respectively. The formula 
PN
n¼1
βn þ βM ¼ 1 has been proved by Yang (2001) and Yang and Xu 
(2002). The final risk level of the ith risk factor can be given as follows: 
S Rið Þ ¼ ðβni Rið Þ;Hn; i ¼ 1; � � � ; 3; n ¼ 1; � � �N
� �
(21) 
3.4. Step 4. obtaining crisp risk numbers for ranking
The risk assessment results shown in Eq. (21) present the risk level of the ith risk factor of the 
investigated port. It can provide decision-makers with a whole view about the risk level of the 
investigated port, from which they can understand what belief degrees are assigned to the grades, 
and which grades the selected ports are assessed to. However, it is not helpful for decision-makers to 
understand the risk ranking among the ports along the MSR. Therefore, we have introduced the 
concept of expected utility to obtain numerical values for a risk ranking purpose. Define the utility 
value of an assessment grade Hn is uðHnÞ, and the definition of the expected utility of the general 
assessment in kth port u E pkð Þð Þ is presented in Eq. (22): 
u EðpkÞð Þ ¼
XN
n¼1
βni uðHnÞ (22) 
where βni denotes the lower bound of the probability that the kth investigated selected port is 
assessed to Hn, and the upper bound of the probability is βn þ βM (Yang 2001; Yang et al. 2009), 
which means if the risk assessment is incomplete (βM�0), there is a utility interval ½βn; ðβn þ βMÞ�. 
According to the assessment grade in Section 3.2, the most preferred linguistic term is very low, 
which means the lowest utility denoted by uðH1Þ. The least preferred linguistic term is very high, 
which means the highest utility denoted by uðH5Þ. The maximum, minimum and average utilities 
ofEðpkÞ are determined using Eqs. (23)—(25) (e.g. Yang et al. 2009): 





βnu Hnð Þ (23) 





βnu Hnð Þ (24) 
uaverage pkð Þ ¼
Umax pkð Þ þ Umin pkð Þ
2
(25) 
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The above formulas disclose that if uðH1Þ ¼ 0, then u EðpkÞð Þ ¼ umin pkð Þ. At the same time, if the 
risk assessment is complete, then βM ¼ 0 and u EðpkÞð Þ ¼ umax pkð Þ ¼ umin pkð Þ ¼ uaverage pkð Þ. In 
addition, one should note that the above utilities can be only applied for characterizing a distributed 
assessment and cannot be used in the process of aggregating risk factors. When it comes to ranking 
safety levels between two ports, the detailed process based on their utility intervals can be listed as 
follows. If umax ptð Þ � umin psð Þ, pt is better than ps; if umin psð Þ ¼ umin ptð Þ and umax psð Þ ¼ umax ptð Þ, 
ps is said to be equal to pt . Otherwise, the preference of pt over ps can be calculated using Eq. (26) 
(Wang, Yang, and Xu 2005): 
P ps < ptð Þ ¼
max 0; umax psð Þ   umin ptð Þð Þ   max 0; umin psð Þ   umax ptð Þð Þ
umax psð Þ   umin psð Þð Þ þ umax ptð Þ   umin ptð Þð Þ
(26) 
It is obvious that P ps < ptð Þ þ P pt < psð Þ ¼ 1 and P ps < ptð Þ ¼ P pt < psð Þ ¼ 0:5 when ps ¼ pt . If 
P ps < ptð Þ > P pt < psð Þ, then pt is said to be better to ps to the degree of P ps < ptð Þ, presented by 
pt � ps; if P ps < ptð Þ ¼ P pt < psð Þ, then ps is said to be equal to pt , presented by ps,pt ; if 
P ps < ptð Þ<P pt < psð Þ, then pt is said to be subordinate to ps to the degree of 1   P ps < ptð Þ, 
presented by pt � ps.
4. Case study
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed methodology and evaluate the significance of 
the analysis results in terms of their representation practice, we selected ports along the MSR based on 
their annual throughput and annual number of ship calls. The top 10 ports along the MSR in terms of 
both throughput and ship calls1 are invited to participate in this study. Only five ports are actively 
responsive with valid data to conduct the case analysis. The above five ports numbered as Port 1–5 are 
finally selected to support the case study. It is conducted under a fuzzy environment and decision- 
makers’ preference to show the capability to assess the safety of the ports using the proposed approach.
Based on the methodology illustrated in Section 3 and available information in Section 2, 
a hierarchical port risk assessment structure is constructed in Section 4.1 and the application of 
the fuzzy ER approach is shown in Section 4.2.
4.1. Identify risk factors and develop a hierarchical structure
Based on the literature review in Section 2 and the identification process in Section 3.1, we identify 
the safety risk factors and present them in Figure 3.
The above process is conducted by the consultancy with the domain experts who have a wealth of 
expertise in port safety and security and are very familiar with the MSR port operation. The profile of 
the selected three experts is shown in Table 4. The experience and qualifications of the three experts 
were carefully evaluated for data robustness during the selection procedure, the selected experts are 
capable of assessing the issues studied, partially supported by the consistency of their raw evaluations.
4.2. Obtain belief degrees of the risk grades used to describe P and S
Fuzzy ratings of the selected port are collected from the three experts in Section 4.1. These 
experts are investigated to give fuzzy ratings for the P and S related linguistic terms of each risk 
factor displayed in Figure 3 based on the defined fuzzy membership functions presented in 
Table 1 and Table 2. The fuzzy ratings of P are given by experts directly, and the fuzzy ratings 
of S are synthesized by the three consequences shown in Table 2. The results of TFNPS for the 
case of Port 1 are shown in Table 5 based on the calculation using Eq. (4). The risk levels in the 
form of TFNPS displayed in Table 5 are transformed to the H through the process discussed in 
Section 3.2.3 shown in Table 6. The detailed fuzzy ratings of the other two experts are shown in 
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Appendix A-D. Since the relative weights of all experts are given equally, the aggregated 
assessment results of three experts are obtained by averaging and shown in Table 7. The 
aggregated fuzzy ratings by three experts for the other four ports are presented in Appendix E.
Risk assessment 
























Goal level First level Second level
Figure 3. A hierarchy for the risk factors of an MSR port.







engaged in maritime safety under The Belt and Road Initiative 
(B&R)
12
2 professional port safety and operation management 8
3 captain port safety and operation department 17
Table 5. Fuzzy ratings, case of Port 1 from expert 1.
Risk factors Granular of P and S TFNP TFNS TFNPS
R11 3 and 2 (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) (0.000, 0.125, 0.375)
R12 2 and 3 (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.000, 0.125, 0.375)
R13 2 and 4 (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) (0.50, 0.75, 1.00) (0.000, 0.188, 0.500)
R14 2 and 4 (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) (0.50, 0.75, 1.00) (0.000, 0.188, 0.500)
R21 2 and 4 (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) (0.50, 0.75, 1.00) (0.000, 0.188, 0.500)
R22 2 and 5 (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.000, 0.250, 0.500)
R31 3 and 2 (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) (0.000, 0.125, 0.375)
R32 2 and 3 (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.000, 0.125, 0.375)
R33 3 and 4 (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.50, 0.75, 1.00) (0.125. 0.375, 0,750)
R34 3 and 2 (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) (0.000, 0.125, 0.375)
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4.3. Apply an ER algorithm to aggregate the risk assessment from a risk factor to port level
Before applying an ER algorithm to aggregate the risk assessment of the risk factors, the weights of 
the risk factors are calculated by AHP. Three experts are invited to give the pairwise comparisons in 
the same level of the hierarchical structure. The input data on weights of the first level are averaged 
from the three experts as shown in Table 8. Similarly, the relative weights of all other risk factors of 
the second level are assigned in Table 9. Having obtained the weights and belief degree against the 
defined linguistic terms of P and S, the ER approach is applied to perform the risk assessment of an 
MSR port.
In the case of Port 1, the risk assessment is obtained by using Eqs. (6)—(21). Firstly, the risk 
factors of the second level are aggregated to generate results for the risk factors at the first level. 
Secondly, the risk factors of the first level are aggregated to generate an overall result for Port 1. 
These results are displayed in Table 10 and Figure 4.
As shown in Figure 4, the result for Port 1 is obtained as {(23.73%, VL), (45.05%, L), (25.24%, M), 
(5.74%, H), (0.24%, VH)}. It can be understood that the risk level of Port 1 is estimated as Very Low 
with a belief degree of 0.2373, Low with a belief degree of 0.4505, Medium with a belief degree of 
Table 6. Transformed ratings, case of Port 1 from expert 1.
Risk factors TFNPS HR [VL, L, M, H, VH] H [VL, L, M, H, VH]
R11 (0.000, 0.125, 0.375) [0.67, 0.75, 0.25, 0, 0] [0.40, 0.45, 0.15, 0, 0]
R12 (0.000, 0.125, 0.375) [0.67, 0.75, 0.25, 0, 0] [0.40, 0.45, 0.15, 0, 0]
R13 (0.000, 0.188, 0.500) [0.57, 0.89, 0.44, 0, 0] [0.30, 0.47, 0.23, 0, 0]
R14 (0.000, 0.188, 0.500) [0.57, 0.89, 0.44, 0, 0] [0.30, 0.47, 0.23, 0, 0]
R21 (0.000, 0.188, 0.500) [0.57, 0.89, 0.44, 0, 0] [0.30, 0.47, 0.23, 0, 0]
R22 (0.000, 0.250, 0.500) [0.50, 1.00, 0.50, 0, 0] [0.25, 0.50, 0.25, 0, 0]
R31 (0.000, 0.125, 0.375) [0.67, 0.75, 0.25, 0, 0] [0.40, 0.45, 0.15, 0, 0]
R32 (0.000, 0.125, 0.375) [0.67, 0.75, 0.25, 0, 0] [0.40, 0.45, 0.15, 0, 0]
R33 (0.125. 0.375, 0,750) [0.25, 0.75, 0.80, 0.40, 0] [0.12, 0.34, 0.36, 0.18, 0]
R34 (0.000, 0.125, 0.375) [0.67, 0.75, 0.25, 0, 0] [0.40, 0.45, 0.15, 0, 0]
Table 7. Aggregated linguistic terms of three experts, case of Port 1.
Expert E1 E2 E3 Aggregated results
R11 [0.40, 0.45, 0.15, 0, 0] [0.20, 0.48, 0.27, 0.05, 0] [0.30, 0.47, 0.23, 0, 0] [0.30, 0.47, 0.22, 0.01, 0]
R12 [0.40, 0.45, 0.15, 0, 0] [0.12, 0.34, 0.36, 0.18, 0] [0.40, 0.45, 0.15, 0, 0] [0.31, 0.42, 0.22, 0,05, 0]
R13 [0.30, 0.47, 0.23, 0, 0] [0.12, 0.34, 0.36, 0.18, 0] [0.20, 0.48, 0.27, 0.05, 0] [0.21, 0.43, 0.29, 0.07, 0]
R14 [0.30, 0.47, 0.23, 0, 0] [0.25, 0.50, 0.25, 0, 0] [0.20, 0.48, 0.27, 0.05, 0] [0.25, 0.48, 0.25, 0.02, 0]
R21 [0.30, 0.47, 0.23, 0, 0] [0.30, 0.47, 0.23, 0, 0] [0.20, 0.48, 0.27, 0.05, 0] [0.27, 0.47, 0.24, 0.02, 0]
R22 [0.25, 0.50, 0.25, 0, 0] [0.05, 0.26, 0.46, 0.23, 0] [0.12, 0.34, 0.36, 0.18, 0] [0.14, 0.37, 0.36, 0.13, 0]
R31 [0.40, 0.45, 0.15, 0, 0] [0.58, 0.42, 0, 0, 0] [0.20, 0.48, 0.27, 0.05, 0] [0.39, 0.45, 0.14, 0.02, 0]
R32 [0.40, 0.45, 0.15, 0, 0] [0.20, 0.48, 0.27, 0.05, 0] [0.75, 0.25, 0, 0, 0] [0.45, 0.39, 0.14, 0.02, 0]
R33 [0.12, 0.34, 0.36, 0.18, 0] [0, 0.18, 0.37, 0.30, 0.15] [0.40, 0.45, 0.15, 0, 0] [0.18, 0.32, 0.29, 0.16, 0.05]
R34 [0.40, 0.45, 0.15, 0, 0] [0.58, 0.42, 0, 0, 0] [0.75, 0.25, 0, 0, 0] [0.58, 0.37, 0.05, 0, 0]
Table 8. Pairwise comparisons in term of risk factor at the first level.
R R1 R2 R3 weight
R1 1.00 0.8 1.4 0.337
R2 1.25 1.00 1.75 0.421
R3 0.71 0.57 1.00 0.242
Table 9. Weights of all risk factors at the second level.
Risk factors R11 R12 R13 R14 R21
Weights 0.183 0.324 0.412 0.081 0.412
Risk factors R22 R31 R32 R33 R34
Weights 0.588 0.132 0.391 0.312 0.165
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0.2524, High with a belief degree of 0.0574, and Very High with a belief degree of 0.0024. The results 
of the other four ports are presented in Appendix F-G, respectively. It is worth noting that all the 
results in this paper are based on the synthesis of the selected experts’ assessment.
In general, it is interesting to know that for each investigated port, the risk level at the goal level 
has the highest belief degree assigned to the ‘Low’ grade and the lowest belief degree to ‘Very high’ 
grade. Such a result reveals that the five ports have relatively good practice on their safety manage-
ment. However, there is still some hidden risks needing more attention according to the results 
presented above. Furthermore, it is important to compare the overall risk of the five ports for 
rational safety resource allocation from an MSR network perspective. Therefore, the decision- 
makers’ preference information is applied to obtain crisp numbers for a port risk ranking purpose 
in Section 4.4.
4.4. Obtain crisp numbers for port risk ranking
Port risk ranking information is important for various stakeholders. For instance, for cargo/ship 
owners, they consider the use of the safest ports in their regions along the MSR, while for port 
operators, port risk ranking based on different risk factors is probably a more sensitive tool to 
improve their ports’ safety and hence competitiveness. Therefore, to obtain crisp numbers for both 
port level overall ranking and risk factor-based ranking, the preference information associated with 
each linguistic term is required. The linear utility function shown in Figure 5 is first assigned (e.g. 
Yang et al. 2009; Yang, Wang, and Li 2013) in this paper for an illustration purpose to present risk 
ranking. From Figure 5, the utility value to each linguistic term is generated as (0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1). 
The utility value represents that the lower the utility value is, the better the safety level a port has. 
Thus, based on Figure 5 and Eqs. (22)—(25), the calculated ranking value (RV) for the case of Port 1 
Table 10. The aggregated distributed results, Case of Port 1.
Risk factors
Degrees of belief assigned to each risk factors of the first level
VL L M H VH
R1 0.2508 0.4595 0.2446 0.0450 0.0000
R2 0.1757 0.4246 0.3146 0.0832 0.0000
R3 0.3864 0.3838 0.1626 0.0536 0.0136
Figure 4. Risk estimates of Port 1 case.
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is 0.2843. In the case of Port 1, the aggregated result 
PN
n¼1
βn ¼ 1 and βM ¼ 0 (i.e. the assessment is 
complete), and there is not a belief interval involved. The detailed calculated results of ranking value 
(RV) for the cases of the other four ports are shown in Table 11.
RVport1 ¼ 0:2373� 0þ 0:4505� 0:25þ 0:2524� 0:5þ 0:0574� 0:75þ 0:0024� 1 ¼ 0.2843
As shown in Table 11, Port 5 has the lowest values with 0.2635, followed by Port 4 (0.2686), Port 
2 (0.2793), port 1 (0.2843), and Port 3 has the highest values with 0.3192. The result indicates that 
Port 5 is the safest port.
In terms of the risk factor level analysis, as shown in Table 12, the ranking of the first level factors 
is mostly consistent with the overall ranking in Table 11. To be more specific, Port 5 has the lowest 
value in terms of the risk factors in the safety and security risk categories. Port 2 represents its 
advantage regard of the management risk category. Although Port 4 does not show an obvious 
advantage in the ranking of an individual risk factor, its overall ranking can reach second place due 
to its relatively high safety performance across all the three categories. On the contrary, Port 3 is 
ranked last in the overall ranking value, largely due to its poor performance at the safety and 
security risk categories.
The ranking of the second level factors as shown in Table 13 can provide insightful information 
on making tangible control measures. Port 5 ranks first against R12, R13, R21, R22, and R31, which 
shows the advantages of Port 5 in the above risk factors. Port 3 has the worst rank in terms of the 
most risk factors. Port 3 should make effort to implement more corresponding control measures to 






Figure 5. Utility function.
Table 11. Overall Ranking value (RV), cases of five ports.
Ports ranking value (RV) Rank
Port 1 0.2373 × 0 + 0.4505 × 0.25 + 0.2524 × 0.5 + 0.0574 × 0.75 + 0.0024 × 1 = 0.2843 4
Port 2 0.2856 × 0 + 0.3936 × 0.25 + 0.2390 × 0.5 + 0.0818 × 0.75 + 0.0000 × 1 = 0.2793 3
Port 3 0.1912 × 0 + 0.4479 × 0.25 + 0.2690 × 0.5 + 0.0970 × 0.75 + 0.0000 × 1 = 0.3192 5
Port 4 0.2917 × 0 + 0.4081 × 0.25 + 0.2342 × 0.5 + 0.0660 × 0.75 + 0.0000 × 1 = 0.2686 2
Port 5 0.2812 × 0 + 0.4497 × 0.25 + 0.2031 × 0.5 + 0.0660 × 0.75 + 0.0000 × 1 = 0.2635 1
Table 12. Ranking value of the first level, cases of five ports.
Ports Safe risk (R1) Security risk (R2) Management risk (R3)
RV Rank RV Rank RV Rank
Port 1 0.2709 4 0.3259 3 0.2311 3
Port 2 0.2456 2 0.3438 4 0.2187 1
Port 3 0.3160 5 0.3668 5 0.2238 2
Port 4 0.2498 3 0.3111 2 0.2319 4
Port 5 0.2149 1 0.2679 1 0.2321 5
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improve its port overall safety by using benchmarking and learning from the best practice of the 
leader (i.e. Port 5) from the investigated MSR ports.
In order to further verify the reliability of the results, a sensitivity analysis approach by adjusting 
the weights of the risk factors is employed in this study. A minor decline or increment of the weights 
for the risk factors will result in a decrease or an increase of the outputs data i.e. rankings 
correspondingly. In order to carry out the validation, we increase 20% of the weight of the experts’ 
knowledge for one expert (randomly selected) against one first level risk factor (i.e. management 
risk). The amended new results are shown in Table 14. The new ranking result of the five ports is 
shown in Table 15. It is seen that the ranking result changes accordingly. To be more specific, 
because Port 2 has the best performance in terms of management risk factors, its ranking improves 
the most when the weight of R3 is increased. In contrast, Port 5 having the worst performance 
against the management risk category drops the most in the ranking. It partially validates the model 
and result since both of them well reflects the reality simulated in the sensitivity analysis.
Furthermore, to test the effect of the linearly assigned utility values (i.e. (0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1)) on 
the final port risk ranking, this section conducts a benchmark study by applying another established 
defuzzification utility value distribution method (e.g. Wan, Yang, and Sen 1996). From Figure 2, the 
defuzzied values of the five linguistics terms of the risk level can be calculated using a centroid 
method (e.g. Yang and Wang 2015) as (0.083, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.917)). The revised ranking of the five 
ports based on the new utility values is obtained and presented in Table 16. The two sets of results in 
Tables 11 and 16 are in a good harmony, which supports the robustness of the model and the result 
in the paper.
Table 13. Ranking value of the second level, cases of five ports.
Rankings of risk factors Port 1 Port 2 Port 3 Port 4 Port 5
R11 4 1 5 3 2
R12 4 3 5 2 1
R13 3 4 5 2 1
R14 2 1 5 4 3
R21 4 2 3 5 1
R22 3 4 5 2 1
R31 3 5 2 4 1
R32 4 1 3 2 5
R33 5 1 4 2 3
R34 1 4 2 5 3
Table 14. Re-calculated weights for sensitivity analysis.
Goal level First level risks Old weights New weights
Risk assessment R1 (0.337) (0.326) #
R2 (0.421) (0.407) #
R3 (0.242) (0.267) "
Table 15. Comparisons of ranking results between different weights.
Ports Old weights New weights
RV Rank RV Rank
Port 1 0.2843 4 0.2714 3
Port 2 0.2793 3 0.2518 1
Port 3 0.3192 5 0.3241 5
Port 4 0.2686 2 0.2634 2
Port 5 0.2635 1 0.3013 4
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5. Discussion and research implications
The development of the MSR stimulates the paradigm-shift of port safety research from individual 
analysis using different standards at a local node level to integrated diagnosis based on the same 
framework at a global level. This research contributes to the safety evaluation of ports along the 
MSR from a global perspective under uncertainties. In this study, the selected representative ports 
were carefully investigated in order to propose a common framework for safety evaluation research 
of ports along the MSR. The research implications are drawn from both theoretical and practical 
perspective as follows.
As for the theoretical research implications, this is a new study taking into account the super-
iority of the ER approach model using quantitative and qualitative factors to develop a generic risk 
assessment at a global level for safe transportation along the MSR. As qualitative data are often 
ambiguous to use in a scientific way, and quantitative risk data are often difficult to obtain, the use 
of ER in this paper helps address both quantitative and qualitative information in a meaningful way 
and provides decision-makers with a powerful tool to realise a more comprehensive evaluation of 
MSR port safety.
The research findings of this paper contribute to managerial practices and policy suggestions in 
the port safety evaluation along the MSR. Firstly, this study provides maritime stakeholders with 
a standard tool to facilitate the coordination and cooperation of safety resources at a global/macro 
level for safe ship network configuration. It can help maritime stakeholders to make rational safety 
decisions based on a comparative analysis of other relative ports. Specifically, cargo/ship owners can 
use it to choose the safest port in their service regions, while port operators can use it to figure out 
their strengths and weaknesses in terms of safety management. Furthermore, it is possible for the 
underperformed ports to learn the best safety practice from the cooperative ports who have shown 
safety strengths against their weaknesses. Secondly, this paper shows all the risk factors through 
a careful investigation in a transparent way and hence port managers can use the risk factor hierarchy 
as a safety KPI dashboard for risk self-assessment, monitoring and improvement. Furthermore, it 
enables port managers to better understand and value the experience and practices from the other 
ports and offers diagnostic tools for maritime stakeholder relations management. Finally, this paper 
asserts the safety performance of the key ports along the MSR, and helps gain useful insights for port 
stakeholders on their strategic investment in future. It could help trigger a new wave of MSR port 
safety evaluation when it is popularised and used by policy makers for justifying financial investment 
reference in future. In this respect, this study evaluates the safety of the five major ports, as 
a pioneering pilot, to propose a generic framework that can aid to assess different types of risks. 
The comparative analysis on the performance of the five ports against ‘Level 2’ and ‘Level 1’ factors 
can be used to identify where decision-makers should enhance their safety resources in view of 
improving port robustness and efficiency in the most cost-effective manner, using the benchmark 
approach and lessons learnt from the leading ports against the selected factor(s) where their ports 
have exposed poor performance. For instance, in Section 4, the results in Table 11–13 suggest that 
Port 5 ranks first against the risk factors of cargo spillage, equipment failure, piracy, terrorist attack, 
and congestion. This indicates that port managers could adjust their strategies by referencing the 
experience and practice in terms of the best factors for the overall port safety along the MSR.
Table 16. Overall Ranking value (RV) using a centroid method, cases of five ports.
Ports ranking value (RV) Rank
Port 1 0.2373 × 0.083 + 0.4505 × 0.25 + 0.2524 × 0.5 + 0.0574 × 0.75 + 0.0024 × 0.917 = 0.3038 4
Port 2 0.2856 × 0.083 + 0.3936 × 0.25 + 0.2390 × 0.5 + 0.0818 × 0.75 + 0.0000 × 0.917 = 0.3030 3
Port 3 0.1912 × 0.083 + 0.4479 × 0.25 + 0.2690 × 0.5 + 0.0970 × 0.75 + 0.0000 × 0.917 = 0.3351 5
Port 4 0.2917 × 0.083 + 0.4081 × 0.25 + 0.2342 × 0.5 + 0.0660 × 0.75 + 0.0000 × 0.917 = 0.2928 2
Port 5 0.2812 × 0.083 + 0.4497 × 0.25 + 0.2031 × 0.5 + 0.0660 × 0.75 + 0.0000 × 0.917 = 0.2868 1
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6. Conclusion
This study proposed a novel methodology integrating FST and ER approaches to evaluate the safety 
levels of the key ports along the MSR. The risk-based fuzzy modelling can effectively deal with 
experts’ judgments (i.e. complete or incomplete) by a belief degree structure, and allow risk analysts 
to present information (i.e. crisp data, uncertainty, and subjective judgment) in a unified and reliable 
manner. By using an ER algorithm, the assessment information of the five key ports was aggregated 
to generate their final safety ranking. The ranking values of the five key ports were calculated to 
compare their safety in a systematic way by using the utility theory. Compared to the traditional 
safety evaluation approaches, the new methodology in this paper provides transparent and reliable 
results that can be tailored and used in other MSR ports, with the capability of addressing uncertainty 
and incomplete data in complex systems in a systematic, flexible, and reliable way.
The fuzzy ER approach used in this paper is in nature a kind of multiple attribute decision making 
method. The ER approach can not only model port risk factors in a belief decision matrix but also 
generate reliable results using its powerful function of the risk aggregation process. Moreover, it is 
easy to operate and can provide decision-makers with useful insights in a transparent, comprehen-
sible, and reliable manner for risk management. All of such characteristics are in a great need of 
addressing the challenges in assessing port safety along the MSR. As a result, the findings can aid the 
MSR ports to assess their safety and allow them to learn effective solutions from the leading ports 
with the best performance against certain selected risk factors where the target ports have poor 
performance for an overall safety performance improvement by cross-referencing within the context 
of the MSR. In future, the data the ports of different sizes and locations along the MSR are needed to 
see how the model can be adapted for its applicability across the whole MSR port universe, including 
the weights of the risk factors. It will also be valuable to develop a database to record the best practice 
against different risk factors for future MSR port safety improvement without the need of disclosing 
the identity of the associated leading ports against different risk factors.
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Appendix A. Fuzzy ratings, case of Port 1 from expert 2
Appendix B. Transformed ratings, case of Port 1 from expert 2
Appendix C. Fuzzy ratings, case of Port 1 from expert 3
Risk factors Granular of P and S TFNP TFNS TFNPS
R11 3 and 3 (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.063, 0.250, 0.563)
R12 3 and 4 (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.50, 0.75, 1.00) (0.125, 0.375, 0.750)
R13 3 and 4 (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.50, 0.75, 1.00) (0.125, 0.375, 0.750)
R14 2 and 5 (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.000, 0.250, 0.500)
R21 4 and 2 (0.50, 0.75, 1.00) (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) (0.000, 0.188, 0.500)
R22 3 and 5 (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.75, 1.00, 1.00) (0.188, 0.500, 0.750)
R31 2 and 2 (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) (0.000, 0.063, 0.250)
R32 3 and 3 (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.063, 0.250, 0.563)
R33 4 and 4 (0.50, 0.75, 1.00) (0.50, 0.75, 1.00) (0.250, 0.563, 1.000)
R34 2 and 2 (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) (0.000, 0.063, 0.250)
Risk factors TFNPS HR [VL, L, M, H, VH] H [VL, L, M, H, VH]
R11 (0.063, 0.250, 0.563) [0.43, 1.00, 0.65, 0.11, 0] [0.20, 0.48, 0.27, 0.05, 0]
R12 (0.125, 0.375, 0.750) [0.25, 0.75, 0.80, 0.40, 0] [0.12, 0.34, 0.36, 0.18, 0]
R13 (0.125, 0.375, 0.750) [0.25, 0.75, 0.80, 0.40, 0] [0.12, 0.34, 0.36, 0.18, 0]
R14 (0.000, 0.250, 0.500) [0.50, 1.00, 0.50, 0, 0] [0.25, 0.50, 0.25, 0, 0]
R21 (0.000, 0.188, 0.500) [0.57, 0.89, 0.44, 0, 0] [0.30, 0.47, 0.23, 0, 0]
R22 (0.188, 0.500,0.750) [0.11, 0.56, 1.00, 0.50, 0] [0.05, 0.26, 0.46, 0.23, 0]
R31 (0.000, 0.063, 0.250) [0.80, 0.57, 0, 0, 0] [0.58, 0.42, 0, 0, 0]
R32 (0.063, 0.250, 0.563) [0.43, 1, 0.56, 0.11, 0] [0.20, 0.48, 0.27, 0.05, 0]
R33 (0.250, 0.563, 1.000) [0, 0.44, 0.89, 0.73, 0.36] [0, 0.18, 0.37, 0.30, 0.15]
R34 (0.000, 0.063, 0.250) [0.80, 0.57, 0, 0, 0] [0.58, 0.42, 0, 0, 0]
Risk factors Granular of P and S TFNP TFNS TFNPS
R11 2 and 4 (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) (0.50, 0.75, 1.00) (0.000, 0.188, 0.500)
R12 2 and 3 (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.000, 0.125, 0.375)
R13 3 and 3 (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.063, 0.250, 0.563)
R14 3 and 3 (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.063, 0.250, 0.563)
R21 3 and 3 (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.063, 0.250, 0.563)
R22 3 and 4 (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.50, 0.75, 1.00) (0.125, 0.375, 0.750)
R31 3 and 3 (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.063, 0.250, 0.563)
R32 1 and 1 (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.000, 0.000, 0.063)
R33 2 and 3 (0.00, 0.25, 0.50) (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) (0.000, 0.125, 0.375)
R34 1 and 1 (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25) (0.000, 0.000, 0.063)
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Appendix D. Transformed ratings, case of Port 1 from expert 3
Appendix E. Aggregated linguistic terms of three experts, case of other four ports
Appendix F. The aggregated distributed results, case of five ports
Risk factors TFNPS HR [VL, L, M, H, VH] H [VL, L, M, H, VH]
R11 (0.000, 0.188, 0.500) [0.57, 0.89, 0.44, 0, 0] [0.30, 0.47, 0.23, 0, 0]
R12 (0.000, 0.125, 0.375) [0.67, 0.75, 0.25, 0, 0] [0.40, 0.45, 0.15, 0, 0]
R13 (0.063, 0.250, 0.563) [0.43, 1, 0.56, 0.11, 0] [0.20, 0.48, 0.27, 0.05, 0]
R14 (0.063, 0.250, 0.563) [0.43, 1, 0.56, 0.11, 0] [0.20, 0.48, 0.27, 0.05, 0]
R21 (0.063, 0.250, 0.563) [0.43, 1, 0.56, 0.11, 0] [0.20, 0.48, 0.27, 0.05, 0]
R22 (0.125, 0.375, 0.750) [0.25, 0.75, 0.80, 0.40, 0] [0.12, 0.34, 0.36, 0.18, 0]
R31 (0.063, 0.250, 0.563) [0.43, 1, 0.56, 0.11, 0] [0.20, 0.48, 0.27, 0.05, 0]
R32 (0.000, 0.000, 0.063) [1, 0.33, 0, 0, 0] [0.75, 0.25, 0, 0, 0]
R33 (0.000, 0.125, 0.375) [0.67, 0.75, 0.25, 0, 0] [0.40, 0.45, 0.15, 0, 0]
R34 (0.000, 0.000, 0.063) [1, 0.33, 0, 0, 0] [0.75, 0.25, 0, 0, 0]
Risk Port 2, Port 3 Port 4 Port 5
R11 [0.25, 0.41, 0.23, 0.11, 0] [0.28, 0.37, 0.32, 0.03, 0] [0.28, 0.39, 0.24, 0.09, 0] [0.20, 0.42, 0.23, 0.15, 0]
R12 [0.35, 0.33, 0.31, 0,01, 0] [0.21, 0.47, 0.24, 0,08, 0] [0.41, 0.32, 0.23, 0,04, 0] [0.38, 0.45, 0.15, 0,02, 0]
R13 [0.31, 0.43, 0.24, 0.02, 0] [0.19, 0.35, 0.32, 0.14, 0] [0.26, 0.48, 0.24, 0.02, 0] [0.16, 0.40, 0.32, 0.12, 0]
R14 [0.35, 0.51, 0.13, 0.01, 0] [0.22, 0.45, 0.28, 0.05, 0] [0.19, 0.42, 0.31, 0.08, 0] [0.15, 0.45, 0.28, 0.12, 0]
R21 [0.32, 0.46, 0.19, 0.03, 0] [0.28, 0.49, 0.22, 0.01, 0] [0.25, 0.45, 0.26, 0.04, 0] [0.37, 0.48, 0.14, 0.01, 0]
R22 [0.15, 0.29, 0.33, 0.23, 0] [0.04, 0.39, 0.34, 0.23, 0] [0.24, 0.32, 0.29, 0.15, 0] [0.24, 0.38, 0.26, 0.12, 0]
R31 [0.29, 0.42, 0.24, 0.05, 0] [0.42, 0.45, 0.12, 0.01, 0] [0.34, 0.42, 0.19, 0.05, 0] [0.46, 0.43, 0.09, 0.02, 0]
R32 [0.53, 0.34, 0.12, 0.01, 0] [0.48, 0.36, 0.15, 0.01, 0] [0.46, 0.41, 0.12, 0.01, 0] [0.43, 0.39, 0.16, 0.02, 0]
R33 [0.22, 0.33, 0.28, 0.17, 0] [0.19, 0.32, 0.31, 0.18, 0] [0.23, 0.29, 0.30, 0.18, 0] [0.19, 0.33, 0.31, 0.17, 0]
R34 [0.53, 0.32, 0.09, 0.06, 0] [0.51, 0.38, 0.07, 0.04, 0] [0.48, 0.29, 0.14, 0.09, 0] [0.51, 0.34, 0.12, 0.03, 0]
Ports Risk factors
Degrees of belief assigned to each risk factors of the first level
VL L M H VH
port 1 R1 0.2508 0.4595 0.2446 0.0450 0
R2 0.1757 0.4246 0.3146 0.0832 0
R3 0.3864 0.3838 0.1626 0.0536 0.0136
Port 2 R1 0.3148 0.4138 0.2456 0.0258 0
R2 0.2044 0.3656 0.2803 0.1497 0
R3 0.4192 0.3498 0.1679 0.0630 0
Port 3 R1 0.2040 0.4171 0.2900 0.0889 0
R2 0.1099 0.4532 0.2967 0.1402 0
R3 0.3969 0.3702 0.1738 0.0591 0
Port 4 R1 0.3051 0.4261 0.2332 0.0356 0
R2 0.2394 0.3796 0.2782 0.1028 0
R3 0.3886 0.3650 0.1764 0.0699 0
Port 5 R1 0.2278 0.4481 0.2407 0.0833 0
R2 0.2834 0.4355 0.2075 0.0737 0
R3 0.3781 0.3793 0.1842 0.0602 0
22 M. JIANG ET AL.
Appendix G. Assessment results, cases of five ports
Ports Assessment results
Port 1 {(23.73%, VL), (45.05%, L), (25.24%, M), (5.74%, H), (0.24%, VH)},
Port 2 {(28.56%, VL), (39.36%, L), (23.90%, M), (8.18%, H), (0.00%, VH)}
Port 3 {(19.12%, VL), (44.79%, L), (26.39%, M), (9.70%, H), (0.00%, VH)}
Port 4 {(29.17%, VL), (40.81%, L), (23.42%, M), (6.60%, H), (0.00%, VH)}
Port 5 {(28.12%, VL), (44.97%, L), (20.31%, M), (6.60%, H), (0.00%, VH)}
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